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The practice of sourcing service inputs from overseas suppliers has been growing in response to new
technologies that have made it possible to trade in some business and computing services that were
previously considered non-tradable. This paper estimates the e?ects of o?shoring on productivity in
US manufacturing industries between 1992 and 2000. It finds that service o?shoring has a significant
positive e?ect on productivity in the US, accounting for around 10 percent of labor productivity growth
during this period. O?shoring material inputs also has a positive e?ect on productivity, but the magnitude
is smaller accounting for approximately 5 percent of productivity growth.
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New technologies are making it increasingly possible for ﬁrms to source their service inputs
from suppliers abroad. Recent examples include call centers in India, as well as some more
skill intensive tasks such as computer software development. The practice of global produc-
tion networks has been commonplace for decades. In the OECD, the use of imported inputs
in producing goods that are exported accounted for 21 percent of trade in 1990, and this
grew by 30 percent between 1970 and 1990 (see Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001).1 However,
until recently, global production networks mostly involved the oﬀshoring of manufactured
intermediate inputs, whereas now many services that were previously seen as non-tradable
have become tradeable.2 Whilst service oﬀshoring by manufacturing industries in the US
is still at fairly low levels, the practice is growing rapidly, at an average annual rate of 6.3
percent between 1992 and 2000.3 (See Table 1). Yet the empirical evidence on the eﬀects
of service oﬀshoring is scant. In this paper we estimate whether there are any beneﬁts of
oﬀshoring in the form of productivity growth.4
Oﬀshoring can increase productivity either due to compositional or structural changes.
If a ﬁrm relocates its relatively ineﬃcient parts of the production process to another country,
where they can be produced more cheaply, it can expand its output in stages it has compar-
ative advantage. In this case, the average productivity of the remaining workers increases
due to the change in the composition of the workforce. Moreover, structural changes that in-
1The fragmentation of production stages has been widely studied within a trade theoretic framework by
Dixit and Grossman (1982), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 1999, 2001), Deardorﬀ (1998, 2001), Cordella
and Grilo (1998), Amiti (2005) and others. This same phenomenon has also been referred in the literature
as international production sharing, globalized production, de-localization, slicing up the value chain and
oﬀshoring. Some authors go on to distinguish between who owns the production stage abroad: when it is
owned by the same ﬁrm it is referrred to as vertical FDI or intra-ﬁrm trade; and when it is owned by a
foreign ﬁrm is it referred to as arms length trade or international outsourcing. Antras and Helpman (2004)
distinguish between domestic and international outsourcing.
2This increasing practice of service oﬀshoring has led to strong opposition. Support for free trade among
white collar workers with incomes over $100,000 slid from 57 percent in 1999 to 28 percent in 2004, according
to a study by the University of Maryland. Furthermore, on March 4, 2004, the US Senate passed restrictions
on oﬀshoring by barring companies from most federal contracts if they planned to carry out any of the work
abroad. Some exceptions were to apply, for example defence, homeland security and intelligence contracts
deemed necessary for national security, but this legislation was not passed in the House.
3See Amiti and Wei (2005a) for world trends in service oﬀshoring.
4Note that we do not undertake an overall welfare analysis, and recognize that there could be negative
eﬀects such as a deterioration in the terms of trade. See Samuelson (2004).
2crease the productivity of the remaining workers are also likely. These beneﬁts can arise due
to oﬀshoring material inputs or service inputs due to the access of new input varieties. How-
ever, even larger beneﬁts are likely to arise from oﬀshoring service inputs, such as computing
and information services, either due to workers becoming more eﬃcient from restructuring
or through ﬁrms learning to improve the way activities are performed from importing a soft-
ware package, for example. We estimate the eﬀects of both service and material oﬀshoring
on productivity.
Measuring oﬀshoring by industry requires detailed input/output tables. These are pro-
vided on an annual basis for the period 1992 to 2000 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
( B L S )f o rt h eU Se c o n o m y .W ec o m b i n et h ei n p u t / o u t p u ti n f o r m a t i o nw i t ht r a d ed a t a ,t o
measure service and material oﬀshoring, deﬁned as the share of imported services and mate-
rials, respectively, analogous to the measure of material oﬀshoring in Feenstra and Hanson
(1999). Thus our measure includes imports from aﬃliated and unaﬃliated ﬁrms. Total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) and labor productivity are also measured using data from the BLS.
The data are aggregated up from 450 SIC manufacturing industries to 96 manufacturing
industries in order to match the level of aggregation of the input/output (I/O) tables, which
provides details of service inputs. It is important to net out service inputs when calculating
productivity in order to avoid conﬂating measures due to missing inputs. Labor productivity
in manufacturing grew at an annual average rate of 4 percent between 1992 and 2000.
The results show that service oﬀshoring has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on productivity
in the manufacturing sector. It accounts for around 10 percent of labor productivity growth
over the sample period. These results are robust to including additional controls such as the
use of high technology capital, and the share of total imports. The instrumental variables
estimates indicate a slightly larger positive productivity eﬀect from service oﬀshoring than
those indicated by OLS. Material oﬀshoring also has a positive eﬀect on productivity but
this was not robust across all speciﬁcations, and the magnitude of the eﬀects is lower than
service oﬀshoring, only accounting for 5 percent of total labor productivity growth between
1992 and 2000.
This is the ﬁrst comprehensive study to ﬁnd a link between service oﬀshoring and pro-
ductivity.5 There is only one other study on productivity and international oﬀshoring of
5A number of other studies have focused on employment eﬀects from oﬀshoring. For example, Amiti
3services in the US (see Mann, 2004),6 which is a "back of the envelope" type calculation and
considers only the IT industry. Mann calculates that oﬀshoring in the IT industry led to an
annual increase in productivity of 0.3 percentage points for the period 1995 to 2002, which
translates into a cumulative eﬀect of $230 billion in additional GDP.7 There have been a few
more studies on the productivity eﬀects of oﬀshoring using European data. Gorg and Hanley
(2003) ﬁnd that service oﬀshoring had a positive impact on productivity in the electronics
industry in Ireland between 1990 and 1995. However, this aﬀect disappears when they ex-
tend the study to all manufacturing industries in Ireland, and over a longer period, between
1990 and 1998 (see Gorg et al , 2005). A related study by Girma and Gorg (2004) ﬁnds
positive evidence of service outsourcing on labor productivity and total factor productivity
in the UK between 1980 and 1992, but this study does not distinguish between domestic and
foreign outsourcing, and the study only covers three manufacturing industries.8 In contrast,
we focus on international sourcing of inputs and our data covers all manufacturing industries
in the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and estimation
strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Model and Estimating Framework
This section describes a conceptual framework that motivates the empirical speciﬁcation.9
and Wei (2005b) shows that oﬀshoring has a small negative eﬀect on employment using disaggregated
manufacturing industry data (450 industries) in the US. However, this aﬀect disappears at a more aggregated
level of 96 industries indicating that there is suﬃcient growth in demand in other industries within these
broadly deﬁned classiﬁcations to oﬀset any negative eﬀects. Harrison and McMillan (2005) report correlations
between US multinational employment at home and abroad. Other studies such as Ekholm and Hakkala
(2005) go on to disentangle the employment eﬀects by skill, using Swedish data.
6Ten Raa and Wolﬀ (2001) ﬁnd evidence of positive eﬀects of domestic outsourcing on US manufacturing
productivity — it explains 20% of productivity growth, but does not consider the eﬀects of international
outsourcing.
7This is calculated as follows: globalization led toaf a l lo f1 0t o3 0p e r c e n ti np r i c e so fI Th a r d w a r e ;
taking the mid-point of 20% times the price elasticity of investment equals the change in IT’s investment to
productivity growth. See footnote 5 in Mann (2004).
8Egger and Egger (2005) study the eﬀects of international outsourcing of materials inputs. They ﬁnd that
material input outsourcing has a negative eﬀect on productivity of low skilled workers in the short-run but a
positive eﬀect in the long-run. They found that international outsourcing contributed to 3.3% of real value
added per low-skilled worker in the EU from 1993 to 1997. They attribute the negative short-run eﬀect to
imperfections in the EU labor and goods markets. However, they do not include services in their study.
9This framework is consistent with the theoretical model developed by Mitra and Ranjan (2007).
42.1. Model
The production function for an industry i is given by
Yi = Ai(ossi,osm i)F(Li,K i,M i,S i), (2.1)
where output, Yi,i saf u n c t i o no fl a b o r ,Li, capital, Ki, materials, Mi, and service inputs,
Si. The technology shifter, Ai,i saf u n c t i o no fo ﬀshoring of services (ossi), and oﬀshoring of
material inputs (osmi).
There are at least four possible channels through which oﬀshoring can aﬀect productivity,
Ai:( i )as t a t i ce ﬃciency gain; (ii) restructuring; (iii) learning externalities; and (iv) variety
eﬀects. First, when ﬁrms decide to outsource materials or services to overseas locations they
relocate the less eﬃcient parts of their production stage, so average productivity increases
due to a compositional eﬀect. Second, the remaining workers may become more eﬃcient if
oﬀshoring makes it possible for ﬁrms to restructure in a way that pushes out the technology
frontier. This is more likely to arise from oﬀshoring of service inputs, such as computing
and information, rather than oﬀshoring of material inputs. Third, eﬃciency gains might
arise as ﬁrms learn to improve the way activities are performed by importing services. For
example, a new software package can improve the average productivity of workers.10 Fourth,
productivity could increase due to the use of new material or service input varieties as in
Ethier (1982). Since we cannot distinguish the exact channel of the productivity gain arising
from oﬀshoring, we will specify it in this more general way as entering Ai.
We assume that a ﬁrm chooses the total amount of each input in the ﬁrst stage, and
chooses what proportion of material and service inputs will be imported in the second stage.
The ﬁxed cost of importing material inputs, FM
k ,a n dt h eﬁxed cost of importing service
inputs, FS
k ,v a r yb yi n d u s t r yk. This assumption reﬂects that the type of services or materials
required are diﬀerent for each industry, and hence importing will involve diﬀerent amounts
of search costs depending on the level of the sophistication of the inputs.
10Most people would expect that learning externalities would go from the US to other countries rather than
to the US, but it is in principle a possibility and there has been some evidence showing that US productivity
increased as a result of inward FDI. See Keller and Yeaple (2003).
52.2. Estimation
Taking the log of equation 2.1, and denoting ﬁrst diﬀerences by ∆, the estimating equation
becomes
∆lnYit = α0 + α1∆ossit + α2∆osmit (2.2)
+ β1∆lnLit + β2∆lnKit + β3∆lnMit + β4∆lnSit + δtDt + δiDi + εit.
This ﬁrst diﬀerence speciﬁcation controls for any time invariant industry speciﬁce ﬀects such
as industry technology diﬀerences. In this time diﬀerenced speciﬁcation, we also include year
ﬁxed eﬀects, to control for any unobserved time-varying eﬀect common across all industries
that aﬀect productivity growth, and in some speciﬁcations we also include industry ﬁxed
eﬀects. Some industries may be pioneering industries that are high growth industries and
hence more likely to outsource; and some industries might be subject to higher technical
progress than others. Adding industry ﬁxed eﬀects to a time diﬀerenced equation takes
account of these factors, provided the growth or technical progress is fairly constant over
time. We estimate equations 2.2 using ordinary least squares, with robust standard errors
corrected for clustering. We hypothesize that α1 and α2 are positive. We also include one
period lags of the oﬀshoring variables to take account that productivity eﬀects may not be
instantaneous.11
There are a number of econometric issues that will need to be addressed. First, the
choice of inputs is endogenous. To address this, we estimate the total factor productivity
equation using the Arrellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator, which uses all possible lags of
each variable as instruments.12 An alternative way to address the endogeneity of inputs is to
estimate productivity as value added per worker. Since the dependent variable is redeﬁned
as real output less materials and services, divided by labor, the inputs would not be included
as explanatory variables.
Second, there may also be a problem of potential endogeneity of oﬀshoring. High produc-
tivity ﬁrms may be the ones that are more likely to engage in global production strategies
which could lead to reverse causality. Alternatively, it could be the low productivity ﬁrms
11Longer lags were insigniﬁcant.
12We do not use the Olley-Pakes or Levinsohn-Petrin methodology to address the endogeneity of inputs
because those approaches require ﬁrm-level data whereas our data is at the industry level.
6that engage in oﬀshoring in the expectation that this would improve productivity, hence it
is unclear which way the bias would go. If the same set of ﬁrms are most likely to engage in
oﬀshoring over the sample period then industry ﬁxed eﬀects in a time diﬀerenced equation
would suﬃc e .H o w e v e r ,i ft h e r ea r et i m ev a r y i n gf a c t o r st h a ta ﬀect oﬀshoring and productiv-
ity growth then it is necessary to instrument for oﬀshoring. Unfortunately, valid instruments
for oﬀshoring are unavailable thus we also use the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, which
uses lags as instruments, to also address the potential endogeneity of oﬀshoring.13
3. Data and measurement of oﬀshoring
We estimate the eﬀects of oﬀs h o r i n go np r o d u c t i v i t yf o rt h ep e r i o d1 9 9 2t o2 0 0 0 . S e r v i c e
oﬀshoring (ossi,t) for each industry i at time t is deﬁned as the share of imported service
inputs. Since imports of service and materials inputs by industry are not available, we follow





input purchases of service j by industry i, at time t




imports of service j,a tt i m et
productionj + importsj − exportsj at time t
¸
.
The ﬁrst square bracketed term is the share of service inputs as a proportion of total non-
energy inputs, calculated using annul input/output tables from 1992 to 2000 constructed by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
1992 benchmark tables. The BEA use SIC 1987 industry disaggregation, which consist of
roughly 450 manufacturing industries. These are aggregated up to 96 input/output man-
ufacturing codes by the BLS.14 We include the following ﬁve service industries as inputs
to the manufacturing industries: telecommunications, insurance, ﬁnance, business services,
and computing and information. From column 1 in Table 2, we see that business services is
the largest component of service inputs with an average share of 12% in 2000; then ﬁnance
13Of course, if these variables are correlated over time any endogeneity that exists will persist.
14We were unable to use the more disaggregated BEA I/O tables because the next available year is 1997
and this is under a diﬀerent classiﬁcation system, called NAICS. Unfortunately, the concordance between
SIC and NAICS is not straightforward, thus there would be a high risk that changes in the input coeﬃcients
would reﬂect reclassiﬁcation rather than changes in input intensties. In contrast, the BLS I/O tables use the
same classiﬁcation throughout this period.
7(2.4%); telecommunications (1.3%); insurance (0.5%); and the lowest share is computing
and information (0.4%). There is much variation between industries. For example, in 2000,
business services only accounted for 2 percent in the “household audio and video equipment”
industry whereas business services accounted for 33 percent of total non-energy inputs in the
“ophthalmic goods” industry.
The service industries were aggregated up to these ﬁve service categories to match the
international trade data in the IMF Balance of Payments yearbooks: the share of imports
of services is calculated by applying the economy-wide import share to each industry (the
second bracketed term in equation 3.1 ). In the last column of Table 2, we see that the
import share of all service categories, except communications, increased over the period.
To illustrate how oﬀshoring is calculated, note from Table 2 that the US economy im-
ported 2.2 percent of business services in 2000. We assume that each manufacturing industry
imported 2.2 percent of its business service that year. Thus, on average, the oﬀshoring of
business services is equal to 0.12*0.022=0.3 percent. We aggregate across the ﬁve service
inputs to get the average service oﬀshoring intensity for each industry, ossit. An analogous
measure is constructed for material oﬀshoring, denoted by osmit. From Table 1, we see that
service oﬀshoring in 2000 was only 0.3 percent whereas the material oﬀshoring was 17.4
percent. It should not be surprising that service oﬀshoring in manufacturing is small given
that total service inputs make up only a small share of total inputs in manufacturing. Both
types of oﬀshoring have been increasing over the sample period, with higher growth rates for
service oﬀshoring at an annual average of 6.3 percent compared to an average growth rate
of 4.4 percent for material oﬀshoring.
There are a number of potential problems with these oﬀshoring measures that should be
noted. First, they are likely to under-estimate the value of oﬀshoring because the cost of
importing services is likely to be lower than the cost of purchasing them domestically. While
it would be preferable to have quantity data rather than current values this is unavailable for
the United States. Second, applying the same import share to all industries is not ideal, but
given the unavailability of imports by industry this is our “best guess”. The same strategy
was used by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) to construct measures of material oﬀshoring.
This approach apportions a higher value of imported inputs to the industries that are the
biggest users of those inputs. Although this seems reasonable, without access to actual
8import data by industry it is impossible to say how accurate it is. Despite these limitations,
we believe that combining the input use information with trade data provides a reasonable
proxy of the proportion of imported inputs by industry.
The BLS data sources are used for estimation of productivity to match the level of
aggregation of the oﬀshoring ratios. However, capital stock was only available from the
Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) at the SIC level so needed to be aggregated up
to the BLS I/O level. We adopt the perpetual inventory method to extend the capital
stock series beyond 1996, using average depreciation rates that were applied in the NBER
(Bartelsman and Gray, 1996) database: 7.7 percent depreciation for equipment and 3.5
percent for structures. Productivity is estimated at the more aggregate BLS I/O industry
level because service inputs by industry are only available from the I/O tables and these
need to be subtracted from gross output in order to ensure that productivity growth is not
inﬂated in service-intenstive industries as an artifact of an omitted variable. All the summary
statistics are provided in Table 3.
4. Results
We estimate equation 2.2 at the industry level for the period 1992 to 2000. All variables are
e n t e r e di nl o gﬁrst diﬀerences, except those that are constructed as ratios, such as service
and material oﬀshoring. All estimations include year ﬁxed eﬀects and some speciﬁcations
also include industry ﬁxed eﬀects. The errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity by
clustering at the industry level.
4.1. Total Factor Productivity
The results from estimating equation 2.2 using OLS are presented in Table 4. Columns 1 to
4 include year ﬁxed eﬀects, and columns 5 to 9 include year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. All
columns show that service oﬀshoring has a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on total factor produc-
tivity. That is, holding all factors of production constant (total services, materials, labor and
capital stock), increasing the share of service oﬀshoring leads to higher output. In the ﬁrst
column we only include the change in oﬀshoring in period t; in the second column we only
include the lagged value (t − 1); whereas in the third column we include both the contem-
9poraneous and lagged values of oﬀshoring. In column 4, we split employment by production
and non-production workers (proxies for unskilled and skilled workers respectively), to en-
sure that changes in skill composition are not driving the results.15 We ﬁnd this breakdown
hardly aﬀects the size of the oﬀshoring coeﬃcients. In each speciﬁcation, service oﬀshoring
is individually signiﬁcant in the current and lagged periods, and jointly signiﬁcant, with a
p-value less than 0.01. Similarly, service oﬀshoring is positive and signiﬁcant in columns
5t o8w i t hi n d u s t r ye ﬀects, with the coeﬃcients now larger. The coeﬃcient on material
oﬀshoring is positive and signiﬁcant only in some of the speciﬁcations.
The endogeneity of input choices could result in biased estimates using OLS estimation.
To address this issue, we re-estimate equation 2.2 using the Arrellano-Bond dynamic panel
estimation technique in column 9. In this speciﬁcation, all possible lags of each variable
are used as instruments, and the lagged dependent variable is also included but this is
insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on service oﬀshoring remains positive and signiﬁcant, with the
size of the joint eﬀect of the current and lagged oﬀshoring variables a little smaller than the
coeﬃcients in the OLS estimation. The eﬀect of material oﬀshoring is now higher, with the
lagged coeﬃcient positive and signiﬁcant.
4.2. Labor Productivity
An alternative way to address the endogeneity of labor, material and service inputs is to
estimate the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on labor productivity. This is measured by value added
per worker, calculated by taking the diﬀerence between real output and real materials and
services, divided by employment. The results are presented in Table 5.16 In columns 1 to 3,
with only year ﬁxed eﬀects, we see that lagged service and material oﬀshoring are positive
and signiﬁcant in columns 2 and 3. Once we add industry eﬀects in columns 4 to 6, the size
of the coeﬃcients on service oﬀshoring become larger, and both the contemporaneous and
lagged variables are signiﬁcant, however material oﬀshoring becomes insigniﬁcant.
15This was the most detailed skill level data available.
16All speciﬁcations include capital stock as an explanatory variable. However, estimates without capital
stock produce the same results.
104.2.1. Additional Controls
There may be concern that the service oﬀshoring measure is correlated with omitted variables
such as high-technology capital or total imports, which may be inﬂating the coeﬃcients
on service oﬀshoring. To address this we include a measure of high technology capital
as in Feenstra and Hanson (1999); and the share of imports by industry. The data for
high-technology capital stock are estimates of the real stock of assets within two-digit SIC
manufacturing industries, from the BLS. High-technology capital includes computers and
peripheral equipment, software, communication equipment, oﬃce and accounting machinery,
scientiﬁc and engineering instruments, and photocopy and related equipment. Each capital
asset is then multiplied by its ex post rental price to obtain the share of high-tech capital
services for each asset within each two-digit SIC industry (also estimated by BLS), and
reﬂects the internal rate of return in each industry and capital gains on each asset.17
The high-tech capital share measured with ex post rental prices is included in column
1 of Table 6, and turns out to be insigniﬁcant. Import share, deﬁned as the ratio of total
imports to output by industry, is included in column 2. This shows that tougher import
competition has a positive eﬀect on labor productivity, but its inclusion leaves the eﬀect of
service oﬀshoring unchanged. In columns 3 and 4 we include industry eﬀects and, again, we
ﬁnd that the service oﬀshoring coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and larger with industry eﬀects in
columns 4 and 5; the coeﬃcient on lagged material oﬀshoring is also signiﬁcant with ﬁxed
industry eﬀects. We see from column 4 that the high-tech capital becomes signiﬁcant at the
10% level yet the import share with industry ﬁxed eﬀects, in column 4, becomes insigniﬁcant.
Although the high-tech capital share, with industry ﬁxed eﬀects, has a positive eﬀect on labor
productivity it does not aﬀect the size of the service oﬀshoring coeﬃcients.
With industry level data and a short time series there is concern that outlier industries
might be driving the results. To check that this is not the case here we reestimate the equation
using robust regressions in columns 5 of Table 6 — this uses an iterative process, giving less
weight to outlier observations.18 The service oﬀshoring coeﬃcients are still signiﬁcant but
17Alternatively, the capital stock components can be multiplied by an ex ante measure of rental prices
used by Berndt and Morrison(1995), where the Moody rate of Baa bonds is used to measure the ex ante
interest rate and the capital gains term is excluded. However, these measures were insigniﬁcant in every
speciﬁcation and thus are not included to save space.
18Using the rreg command in STATA, an intial screening is performed based on Cook’s distance >1
11the point estimates are now smaller. Inspection of the data reveals that the tobacco industry
is the main outlier. Omitting tobacco from the estimation (in column 6) provides similar
results to the robust regressions. To ensure that no one industry is driving the results, we
drop tobacco from the subsequent estimations.
4.2.2. Sensititivity: Endogeneity
A more general speciﬁcation would allow for a lagged dependent variable, but this would
result in a correlation with the error term, which is particularly problematic in a ﬁxed
eﬀects model. Thus, as a ﬁnal robustness check on the labor productivity estimates we re-
estimate the equations using Arrellano-Bond GMM analysis. We also include the high-tech
capital share and import share variables in all estimations. In Table 7 we use all lagged
variables as instruments. The results show that service oﬀshoring and high-tech capital
share have a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity, material oﬀshoring has a positive
insigniﬁcant eﬀect, and import share has a negative eﬀect. In all of the speciﬁcations, service
oﬀshoring has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity whereas material oﬀshoring
has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect.
4.3. Discussion of Results
To get an idea of the magnitude of the eﬀects, we calculate the total eﬀect of service oﬀshoring
on labor productivity using the coeﬃcients from the last column in Table 6 and those from
the GMM estimates in Table 7, which range from 0.26 to 0.67. Service oﬀshoring increased
by 0.1 of a percentage point over the sample period, from 0.18 to 0.29 (see Table 1) so
this implies that service oﬀshoring led to an increase of between 2.6 to 6.7 percent in labor
productivity over the sample period. Taking the mid-point between these estimates (of 0.46)
and given that value added per worker increased by an average of 46 percent over the sample
period, this suggests that service oﬀshoring accounted for 10 percent of the average growth
in labor productivity.19 In contrast material oﬀshoring either had an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on
to eliminate gross outliers before calculating starting values, followed by an iterative process: it performs a
regresssion, calculates weights based on absolute residuals, and regresses again using those weights, beginning
with Huber weights followed by biweights as suggested by Li (1985).
19The averages are weighted by value added - the overall service oﬀshoring eﬀect is calculated as (0.46 ∗
0.1)/0.46.
12labor productivity or a much smaller positive eﬀect: taking the mid-point of the material
coeﬃcients from the speciﬁcations where material oﬀshoring was signiﬁcant we ﬁnd that
material oﬀshoring contributed 5 percent to labor productivity.
Given the small size of service oﬀshoring it might appear surprising to ﬁnd such a sizeable
signiﬁcant eﬀect on productivity. This could be due to large compositional eﬀects, such as
labor being reallocated from providing services to the manufacturing plant to performing
some other function. This could involve a shrinkage of the workforce in a plant, and in-
creasing the average productivity of the remaining workers or exit of a plant, thus increasing
the average productivity of the remaining plants. As well as compositional changes, service
oﬀshoring might enable a reorganization of the remaining workers thus increasing their eﬃ-
ciency. It was not possible to assess the mechanism for this growth as ﬁrm level data with
service oﬀshoring information was unavailable.
T h eq u e s t i o nt h e na r i s e sa st ow h yt h ee ﬀect from material oﬀshoring was insigniﬁcant
or smaller than service oﬀshoring? A plausible explanation for this result is that there may
be decreasing returns from scale from oﬀshoring. Material oﬀshoring has been in practice
for many decades and is at fairly high levels whereas the practice of service oﬀshoring is
more recent. It is possible that many of the productivity beneﬁts from material oﬀshoring
have been exhausted. Moreover, the possibility for ﬁrms to restructure in a way that pushes
out the technology frontier is more likely to arise from oﬀshoring of service inputs, such as
computing and information, rather than oﬀshoring of material inputs.
5. Conclusion
Sourcing service inputs from abroad by US ﬁrms is growing rapidly. Although the level
of service oﬀshoring is still low compared to material oﬀshoring, this business practice is
expected to grow as new technologies make it possible to access cheaper foreign labor and
diﬀerent skills. Thus it is important to understand its eﬀects on the domestic economy.
In this paper, we analyzed the eﬀects of service and material oﬀshoring on productivity in
manufacturing industries in the US between 1992 to 2000. We found that oﬀshoring has a
positive eﬀect on productivity: service oﬀshoring accounts for around 10 percent of labor
productivity growth over this period; and material oﬀshoring 5 percent of labor productivity.
13Our analysis suggests a number of possible avenues for future research. First, data
limitations have prevented us from identifying the channels through which service oﬀshoring
has increased productivity. Improvements in the collection of data at the ﬁrm level with
information distinguishing between domestic input purchases from imports, combined with
detailed skill level data would be a major step forward in making this type of analysis
possible. Second, as well as productivity eﬀects, oﬀshoring is likely to have terms of trade
and income distribution eﬀects. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) found that material outsourcing
explained about 40 percent of the increase in the skill premium in the US in the 1980s. Given
that service oﬀshoring is likely to be more skill intensive than material oﬀshoring, it will be
interesting to see what eﬀects, if any, service oﬀshoring has on the wage skill premium.
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Table 1 Material and Service Offshoring 1992-2000 
 
  Material offshoring- OSM  Service offshoring - OSS 
Year %  %∆ % %∆ 
1992  11.72   0.18  
1993  12.68  5.25 0.18 4.88 
1994  13.41  5.06 0.20 6.39 
1995  14.18  4.65 0.20 4.10 
1996  14.32  1.75 0.21 6.64 
1997  14.55  1.75 0.23 6.97 
1998  14.94  2.97 0.24 6.57 
1999 15.55 3.49  0.29 16.73 
2000 17.33 10.12 0.29  -2.23 
1992-2000   4.38  6.26 
 
 
Table 2 Service Inputs, by type: 1992 and 2000 
 
Share of Service Inputs (%) 
Services 
Mean Std  Dev Min  Max 
Import of Services 
(%) 
(1992)         
Communication 1.16  0.79  0.25  4.82  2.47 
Financial 1.91  0.63  0.93  4.72  0.25 
Insurance 0.43  0.18  0.16  1.39  1.82 
Other business service  9.69  7.16  1.87  37.93  1.47 
Computer and Information  0.55  0.44  0.02  2.53  0.16 
(2000)         
Communication 1.27  0.94  0.28  5.45  1.18 
Financial 2.37  0.86  0.71  5.28  0.51 
Insurance 0.47  0.22  0.10  1.36  2.84 
Other business service  12.02  8.55  1.89  44.99  2.23 
Computer and Information  0.38  0.31  0.01  2.01  0.62 
Source: BLS, Input-Output Tables and IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.  
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Table 3 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
   
      ossi,t   864 0.239 0.162 0.040  1.071
      ∆ossi,t 768 0.016 0.032 -0.145  0.411
      osmi,t   864 14.949 9.808 1.220  69.255
      ∆osmi,t 768 0.694 1.950 -16.173  21.220
       
      ln(value-added per worker)i,t 864 -2.591 0.480 -4.034  -0.526
      ∆ln(value-added per worker)i,t 768 0.043 0.070 -0.231  0.364
       
      ln(real output)i,t 864 10.112 0.953 6.549  12.979
      ∆ln(real output)i,t 768 0.036 0.074 -0.256  0.443
       
      ln(materials)i,t 864 9.032 1.034 5.577  12.498
      ∆ln(materials)i,t  768 0.031 0.103 -0.567 0.544
       
      ln(services)i,t  864 7.060 1.025 3.892 9.875
      ∆ln(services)i,t  768 0.045 0.075 -0.316 0.418
       
      ln(labor)i,t  864 11.834 0.847 8.618 13.836
      ∆ln(labor)i,t 768 -0.001 0.038 -0.165  0.139
       
      ln(capital stock)i,t 844 9.175 1.030 5.979  11.701
      ∆ln(capital stock)i,t 748 0.029 0.043 -0.809  0.301
       
      htechsharei,t 864 10.070 6.302 2.574  24.112
      ∆htechsharei,t 768 0.265 0.959 -2.899  4.410
       
      impsharei,t 855 0.257 0.486 0.000  3.408
      ∆(impshare)i,t 760 0.014 0.050 -0.375  0.579
Note: (a) htechshare is defined as (high-tech capital services / total capital services). (b) all variables are entered 
as differences of logs except if the variable is constructed as a ratio in which case it is entered as the difference 
in the ratio. 
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Table 4 Total Factor Productivity 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(real output)i,t 
  OLS GMM 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
∆ossi,t 0.235***    0.249***  0.241***  0.341***    0.331***  0.335***  0.258*** 
 (0.059)    (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.051)    (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.043) 
 
∆ossi,t-1   0.094**  0.079*  0.065    0.082***  0.097***  0.093***  0.098*** 
   (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.041)    (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.019) 
 
∆osmi,t 0.001*    0.001*  0.001*  0.001    0.001*  0.001*  0.0005 
 (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.0005)  (0.0004) 
 
∆osmi,t-1   -0.0004  0.0002  0.0002    -0.0003  0.0001  0.0001  0.0004* 
   (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)    (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0002) 
 
∆ln(materials)i,t 0.389***  0.358***  0.404*** 0.406***  0.432***  0.365***  0.443***  0.445***  0.432*** 
 (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.047)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.019) 
 
∆ln(services)i,t 0.563***  0.592***  0.548***  0.546***  0.508***  0.566***  0.496***  0.495***  0.506*** 
 (0.048)  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.022) 
 
∆ln(labor)i,t 0.059***  0.056**  0.056**    0.013  0.017  0.006    
 (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022)    (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.026)     
∆ln(skilled labor)i,t       0.029**        0.006  -0.0004 
       (0.015)        (0.018)  (0.015) 
∆ln(unskilled labor)i,t       0.008        -0.007  -0.003 
       (0.013)       (  0.013)  (0.010) 
∆ln(capital)i,t 0.013  0.010  0.009  0.579*  0.001  -0.005  -0.002  0.007  -0.007 
 (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.032)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.051)  (0.040) 
∆ln(real output)i,t-1                 0.009 
                 (0.008) 
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects  no  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  no 
Joint significance tests: 
∆osst  +∆osst-1=0     F(1,95)=27.99 F(1,95)=20.71     F(1,95)=21.70 F(1,95)=20.24  χ
2(1)=31.81 
     p-value=0.00  p-value=0.00     p-value=0.00  p-value=0.00  p-value=0.00 
∆osmt  +∆osmt-1=0   F(1,95)=2.57 F(1,95)=2.36     F(1,95)=2.19 F(1,95)=2.12  χ
2(1)=0.64 
     p-value=0.11  p-value=0.13     p-value=0.14  p-value=0.15  p-value=0.42 
Observations 748  652  652 640  748  652  652  640  541 
R-squared 0.96  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.98   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Sargan overidentification test in column (9) 
estimation χ
2(20)=23.08, p-value=0.28; and H0: no autocorrelation  z =1.85 Pr> z = 0.064.   
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Table 5 Labor Productivity 
 
Dependent variable:  ∆ln(value added per worker)t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆ossi,t 0.214    0.236  0.298**    0.386** 
  (0.150)  (0.162)  (0.143)  (0.167) 
 
∆ossi,t-1   0.310*  0.292*    0.414**  0.418*** 
   (0.174)  (0.154)    (0.164)  (0.150) 
 
∆osmi,t 0.001    0.003  -0.001    0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
 
∆osmi,t-1   0.003*  0.003**    0.001  0.002 
   (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
∆ln(capital)i,t 0.166*  0.186*  0.196*  0.099  0.108***  0.129*** 
  (0.097) (0.101) (0.100) (0.063) (0.033) (0.036) 
 
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes 
Joint significance tests: 
∆osst  +∆osst-1=0   F(1,95)=3.84    F(1,95)=10.53 
   p-value=0.05     p-value=0.00 
 
∆osmt  +∆osmt-1=0   F(1,95)=2.45     F(1,95)=0.38 
   p-value=0.12     p-value=0.54 
Observations  748 652 652 748 652 652 
R-squared  0.06 0.07 0.08 0.39 0.41 0.42 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 6 Labor Productivity and Additional Controls 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(value added per worker)t 





 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
∆ossi,t 0.222  0.227  0.383**  0.394**  0.342***  0.235 
 (0.171)  (0.158)  (0.171)  (0.159) 
 
(0.077) (0.217) 
∆ossi,t-1 0.289*  0.306**  0.425***  0.426***  0.266***  0.266** 
 (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.138)  (0.136) 
 
(0.075) (0.116) 
∆osmi,t 0.003  0.005  0.001  0.003  0.004***  0.003 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
∆osmi,t-1 0.003**  0.003**  0.001  0.002*  0.002*  0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
∆ln(capital)i,t 0.196*  0.202**  0.130***  0.129***  0.110**  0.122*** 
 (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
 
(0.048) (0.038) 
∆(htechshare)i,t 0.001    0.003  0.003  0.004*  0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
∆(htechshare)i,t-1 0.005    0.008*  0.008*  0.009***  0.008* 
 (0.005)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
∆(impshare)i,t   -0.142    -0.274  -0.186***  -0.270 
   (0.128)    (0.182) 
 
(0.040) (0.187) 
∆(impshare)i,t-1   0.158**    -0.012  0.124***  -0.011 
   (0.065)    (0.059) 
 
(0.042) (0.058) 
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Joint significance tests: 
∆osst  +∆osst-1=0 F(1,95)=3.44  F(1,94)=4.03  F(1,95)=11.56  F(1,94)=13.47 F(1,535)=31.53 F(1,93)=6.03 
  p-value=0.07  p-value=0.05  p-value=0.00  p-value=0.00 
 
p-value=0.00  p-value=0.02 
∆osmt  +∆osmt-1=0 F(1,95)=2.16  F(1,94)=4.49  F(1,95)=0.22  F(1,94)=1.97 F(1,535)=10.41 F(1,93)=1.09 
  p-value=0.15  p-value=0.04  p-value=0.64  p-value=0.16 
 
p-value=0.00  p-value=0.30 
∆(htechsh)t+∆(htechsh)t-1=0  F(1,95)=0.67  F(1,95)=3.09  F(1,94)=3.45 F(1,535)=9.20 F(1,93)=2.79 
  p-value=0.42  p-value=0.08  p-value=0.07 
 
p-value=0.00  p-value=0.10 
∆(impshare)t+∆(impshare)t-1=0 F(1,94)=0.02    F(1,94)=2.52 F(1,535)=1.14 F(1,93)=2.14 
  p-value=0.88  p-value=0.12  p-value=0.29  p-value=0.15 
Observations 652  645  652  645  645 638 
R-squared 0.08  0.09  0.43  0.45  0.60 0.44 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 Labor Productivity - GMM Analysis 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(value-added per worker)t 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
∆osst   0.330*  0.320  0.305* 
 (0.193)  (0.201)  (0.182) 
∆osst -1 0.378***  0.387***  0.371*** 
 (0.122)  (0.122)  (0.142) 
∆osmt -0.002  -0.002  0.002 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
∆osmt-1 0.000  0.000  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
∆ln(capital)t 0.116***  0.134***  0.130*** 
 (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027) 
∆(htechshare)t   0.005  0.003 
   (0.003)  (0.002) 
∆(htechshare)t-1   0.009**  0.007* 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
∆(impshare)t     -0.342* 
     (0.181) 
∆(impshare)t-1     -0.134 
     (0.084) 
∆(vaw)t-1 -0.199***  -0.196***  -0.276*** 
 (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.063) 
Joint significance tests       
∆osst + ∆osst-1  = 0  χ
2(1)= 10.80  χ
2(1)= 9.75  χ
2(1)= 9.06 
  p-value=0.00  p-value=0.00  p-value=0.00 
∆osmt + ∆osmt-1 = 0  χ
2(1)= 0.04  χ
2(1)= 0.07  χ
2(1)= 0.60 
  p-value=0.85  p-value=0.79  p-value=0.44 
∆(htechshare)t +∆(htechshare)t-1 = 0    χ
2(1)= 4.69  χ
2(1)= 3.55 
(ex post rental prices)   p-value=0.03  p-value=0.06 
∆(impshare)t + ∆(impshare)t-1  = 0     χ
2(1)= 3.92 
     p-value=0.05 
Sargan test  χ
2(20)= 28.65  Χ
2(20)= 29.09  χ
2(20)= 29.19 
  p-value=0.10  p-value=0.09  p-value=0.08 
H0 : no 2
nd order autocorrelation  z =-0.22  z =-0.40  z =0.40 
  p-value=0.83  p-value=0.69  p-value=0.69 
Observations 550  550  544 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 